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The International Scene
By Ian G. WIllIams and Prof. adrIan J. Walters
It has never been an easy matter for judges. The judiciary, an independent branch of government, dealing with, applying or even just considering 
law from another country evokes strong emotions. 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s lat-
est book, The Court and the World: American Law 
and the New Global Realities (Deckle Edge 2015), 
is expected to ignite the politically sensitive topic 
of the role that foreign law should play in American 
judicial decisions. 
 Justice Breyer firmly believes that taking cog-
nizance of what goes on elsewhere is very impor-
tant. “The world we’re operating in is one in which 
by and large everyone believes [that] you have to 
know something about what is going on abroad.”1 
This is clearly a very enlightened view, but it is 
not one that is widely shared in the U.S. However, 
it rests on the dual premise that global problems 
require global coordination and that effective judi-
cial cooperation depends on increasing judicial 
engagement with foreign law. The engagement that 
Justice Breyer envisions is, of course, fundamen-
tal to the resolution of cross-border insolvencies. 
It will need to deepen further if the international-
ist vision associated with universalism — which, 
where practicable, favors a global “one court, one 
law” approach to cross-border insolvencies and 
restructurings — is to gain momentum.
 It has been the better part of 10 years now since 
the U.K. adopted the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade (UNCITRAL) Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency (the “Model Law”) 
by the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 
(CBIR).2 Its impact in the U.K. has not lived up 
to the expectations of some and is probably best 
described as underwhelming.
 Outside of the British Commonwealth, few 
appreciate that CBIR is not a single statutory 
gateway to judicial assistance in cross-border 
insolvency matters. It was added to a pre-existing 
menu of options available to foreign representa-
tives in need of judicial assistance in the U.K. 
Having options is often a good thing, but a single 
workable point of entry such as chapter 153 might 
arguably be better. In addition, the complexity of 
the U.K.’s menu approach might actually be part 
of its problem.
 CBIR coexists with the EU Regulation on 
Insolvency Proceedings (EUReg)4 (which prevails 
over CBIR when there is conflict),5 section 426 
of the Insolvency Act 1986, and historic forms of 
assistance available under the common law. These 
various regimes are discrete, yet they sometimes 
overlap. They effectively divide the world up in 
ways that reflect the rise of the U.K. as an impe-
rial power in previous centuries, and its more recent 
evolution to the status of a participating member 
state of the European Union (EU). 
 EUReg only applies where the debtor has 
its center of main interests (COMI) in the EU. 
Section 426 applies to a number of specially des-
ignated nations from outside the EU, largely con-
sisting of former British Commonwealth coun-
tries.6 The common law of judicial cooperation in 
cross-border insolvency also continues to be avail-
able to foreign representatives from non-EU coun-
tries. Moreover the three non-EU gateways are not 
entirely exclusive. A foreign representative from 
a country that has “favored nation” status under 
section 426 (e.g., a Canadian liquidator) will have 
access to all three non-EU gateways. However, 
foreign representatives from so-called “third” 
countries outside the “section 426 club” depend on 
CBIR and the common law. 
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1 See Adam Liptak, “Justice Breyer Sees Value in a Global View of Law,” New York Times, 
Sept. 12, 2015, available at www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/us/politics/justice-breyer-
sees-value-in-a-global-view-of-law.html?_r=0 (last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
2 The Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1030). Strictly, CBIR only apply 
in Scotland, England and Wales. Identical legislation is in effect for Northern Ireland.
3 11 U.S.C. § 1509(b) (foreign representative granted recognition under chapter 15 has 
direct access to U.S. legal system). See also H.R. Rep. No. 109-31 (2005), p. 110.
16  January 2016 ABI Journal
Ian Williams, LL.B 
is a director with 
RSM Restructuring 
Advisory LLP in 
London and is a 
former member 
of ABI’s Board of 
Directors. Adrian 
Walters is the Ralph 
L. Brill Professor of 
Law at Chicago-Kent 
College of Law, 
Illinois Institute of 
Technology and 
a solicitor of the 
Senior Courts of 
England and Wales. 4 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000, which has been revised with effect from June 26, 2017, by Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings (recast). EUReg 
applies to all EU countries apart from Denmark. 
5 Article 3 of the U.K.’s version of the Model Law states that EUReg prevails in the event of 
a conflict between EUReg and domestic U.K. law. This simply memorializes the position 
under EU law that, by virtue of the U.K.’s obligations under the EU’s founding treaties, 
pre-empts inconsistent domestic laws in any event.
6 These countries include Anguilla, Australia, The Bahamas, Bermuda, Botswana, Brunei, 
Canada, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Republic of Ireland, 
Malaysia, Montserrat, New Zealand, South Africa, St. Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands, 
Tuvalu and the British Virgin Islands. The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man are also 
eligible for assistance. 
Ian G. Williams
RSM Restructuring 
Advisory LLP; London [T]he Model Law appears 
to be a bad fit for the U.K. 
By enacting it, the U.K. has 
signaled its willingness to 
cooperate unilaterally, but 
cooperation in practice 
under CBIR has been patchy.
 What has become increasingly clear with the efflux-
ion of time is that foreign representatives from third 
countries for whom CBIR is critically important can be 
at a significant disadvantage. Included among these third 
countries is the U.S. 
 CBIR offers foreign representatives in proceedings ema-
nating from the country where the debtor has its COMI with a 
straightforward route to recognition of those proceedings in a 
much more streamlined way than is available under the com-
mon law. Recognition of foreign main proceedings also carries 
with it an automatic stay on proceedings in the U.K.7 However, 
issues appear to arise where the foreign representative requires 
more expansive assistance involving, for example, exporting 
the effects of local insolvency law into the U.K.8 This could 
also be a problem that is prevalent in the U.S. as well.9 
 It is well known that attempts under CBIR to domes-
ticate a default judgment from a U.S. avoidance action10 
and to use the insolvency law of the COMI jurisdiction to 
modify English law-governed rights have failed.11 There 
is also a very good chance that the U.K. courts would be 
unlikely to automatically extend the effects of a foreign 
reorganization plan into the U.K. without parallel proceed-
ings being instituted.12
 By contrast, EUReg and section 426 embody a commit-
ment to reciprocal dealing that demands a large measure of 
deference to foreign insolvency law meaning that the things 
that CBIR seems not to deliver to foreign representatives 
relying solely on it could very well be available to foreign 
representatives who have access to U.K. courts under EUReg 
and section 426. There is a two-tier system that cannot be 
desirable if the goal is to promote judicial cooperation in 
cross-border insolvencies.
 While the concept of modified universalism13 is gen-
erally supported by the British judiciary,14 it does come 
with the need or requirement to defer to the insolvency 
law of the home country, and this is where things seem 
to come undone. Both EUReg and section 426 are under-
pinned by treaty-driven bonds of mutual trust or historic 
ties going back centuries. CBIR lacks these features, so it 
is less potent. This is of material importance to countries 
that must solely rely on it and it is submitted that this is 
unsatisfactory. 
 Part of the problem might be the ease with which for-
eign representatives from any country can gain access to 
the U.K. if they satisfy the minimum recognition criteria. 
Judges in the U.K. (and perhaps also in the U.S.) may worry 
that if they take a generous view of the scope of their dis-
cretionary powers in cases coming from countries with 
high-quality legal systems, they might be pre-committing 
themselves to providing comparable assistance to countries 
whose legal systems are of lower quality. Perhaps the pub-
lic policy ground for denial of recognition in Article 6 of 
the Model Law could be used as a filter. However, U.K. 
judges who are used to statutory regimes underpinned by 
international treaty (EUReg) or executive branch accredita-
tion of favored nations (section 426) may not be comfort-
able exercising an ill-defined standard to approve or dis-
credit a foreign legal system. 
 Currently, the Model Law appears to be a bad fit for 
the U.K. By enacting it, the U.K. has signaled its willing-
ness to cooperate unilaterally, but cooperation in prac-
tice under CBIR has been patchy. Urgent consideration 
should be given to developing a more unified approach 
to the granting of assistance under the current tripar-
tite regime for non-EU countries. However, to align the 
assistance available under section 426 (which includes 
the possibility of assistance under the requesting coun-
try’s own insolvency law) with the assistance available 
under CBIR may require the U.K. to move toward a 
country-accreditation model for CBIR akin to the sec-
tion 426 designated-country model. Otherwise, the risk 
is that U.K. judges will continue to give preference to 
softer forms of cooperation that involve U.K. parallel 
proceedings and the application of U.K. law and that are 
not so progressive in advancing the cause of modified 
universalism.  abi
7 Though the automatic stay under Article 20 of the U.K.’s version of the Model Law is coextensive with the 
stay in a U.K. winding-up proceeding, it does not operate to stay enforcement of secured claims.
8 See A. Walters, “Giving Effect to Foreign Restructuring Plans in Anglo-U.S. Private International Law,” 
(2015) 3 NIBLeJ 375.
9 “The Model Law Is Dead. Long Live the Model Law!,” Recovery, Spring 2014, 30-32.
10 Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 A.C. 236 Supreme Court.
11 Fibria Celulose S/A v. Pan Ocean Co. Ltd. [2014] EWHC 2124.
12 Ibid. at 5.
13 The concept of avoiding duplication of cost of multiple insolvency proceedings in cases of multinational 
debtors with countries assisting the home country’s insolvency proceeding.
14 Singularis Holdings Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36.
ABI Journal   January 2016  17
Copyright 2016 
American Bankruptcy Institute. 
Please contact ABI at (703) 739-0800 for reprint permission.
